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By transitioning from a flawed democracy or a hybrid regime 
to a full-fledged democracy, it is hoped that Bosnia, Kosovo, and the other Balkan 
countries will indulge in more effective climate action
Climate Change, Democracy,
and Enclaves in the Balkans
Although there are climate changedeniers (and skeptics) of all sorts,the preponderance of evidence
supports the consensus of climate sci-
entists that climate change is occurring
and that man is likely to be behind
much of it. 
The effects, which are becoming
increasingly catastrophic, include rising
sea levels, melting glaciers, disruption
of various ecosystems, species extinc-
tion and reduction of biodiversity, and
more extreme weather occurrences
world-wide of drought, flooding, torna-
does, and abnormal temperatures.
There are also climate induced conflicts
and immigration. 
Given the nature of this crisis, no coun-
try is free from climate change and its
effects, and that includes countries in
the Balkans. Perhaps the historic flood-
ing that ravaged parts of Bosnia and
Serbia in May of 2014, as well as the
record heat wave and drought in the
summer of 2017 could be harbingers of
future devastation throughout the
region.    
Sense of Urgency
No wonder there is a growing sense of
urgency to climate action. The fact that
we are citizens of the world and that we
share a planet in trouble has finally
begun to take root in our ethos. Most
encouragingly, scientists and policy-
makers around the world have started
to call for substantial mitigation and
adaptation efforts. 
It is now widely held that a reduction in
greenhouse gases (GHGs) and an
adjustment to these effects are key fea-
tures of a comprehensive strategy to
combat anthropocentric climate
change. 
Obviously, any strategy calling for such
efforts goes well beyond individuals
choosing to moderate their own behav-
ior to one that requires governments
making aggressive policy changes and
the International Community engaging
in immediate widespread collective
action and enforcing compliance of all
agreements. 
What should concern us today is the
extent to which countries in the Balkans
can be part of a comprehensive strate-
gy. Is their participation even plausible?   
There are those—“the optimists”—who
point to the fact that mitigation and
adaptation projects are becoming
more common, even in places like
Bosnia and Kosovo. The donor commu-
nity there, which includes the World
Bank, USAID, and the UNDP, has funded
projects on renewable energy, flood
management, watershed develop-
ment, and disaster resilience, to name
only a few. 
But do these projects reflect a compre-
hensive strategy, one that includes a
buy-in by stakeholders at the state, enti-
ty, and municipality levels, and that
coalesces the various ethnic communi-
ties within those countries? Is there a
semblance of solidarity?
I have my doubts. If political leaders on
each side of the Neretva in Mostar can-
not dismantle their parallel govern-
ments and end the duplication of serv-
ices such as public transportation,
policing and garbage collection and if
leaders in North Mitrovica and Prishtina
cannot agree on the structuring and
financing of education, medical care,
and municipal services, how will these
same leaders work together to tackle
the knotty problem of climate change? 
It seems to me that their strong ethno-
nationalist sentiments will get the better
of them, making the building of coali-
tions very difficult.         
“The optimists” may also remind us of
the growing movement calling for a
human right to a healthy environment.
To be honest, this movement is a step in
the right direction. Who wouldn’t
approve such a legal move given that
climate change, or more aptly put,
environmental breakdown, is beginning
to threaten the conditions that form the
basis of human well-being and ulti-
mately survival? 
Different Dimension
This infusion of human rights into the dis-
cussion is significant, for an environ-
mentally-based human right adds a dif-
ferent dimension not only to addressing
climate change but to supporting the
body of already established human
rights as well. According to “the opti-
mists,” this will lead to further collective
action. 
But will such a legal maneuver nudge
the peoples of the Balkans to their sens-
es, getting them to build coalitions and
to agree on a comprehensive strategy?   
Again, I have my doubts. Although
human rights discourse, or, better yet,
human rights-centered ideology, has
become both fashionable and politi-
cally correct among politicians, aca-
demics, and celebrities, there is often a
certain ambivalence by some, espe-
cially when one’s own group is singled
out as perpetrator rather than as victim
or as bystander. 
Moreover, expanding the Universal
Declaration by a single human right is
likely to have little if any impact, given
the notoriously weak enforcement of
human rights law (and environmental
agreements).         
In the end, what dooms these projects
and movement is that their being dis-
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crete/limited and self-serving, respec-
tively, will limit their ability to deal with
what amounts to a planetary crisis,
crossing every conceivable human
boundary, and requiring concerted
efforts by vast interconnected collec-
tives. 
Of course, these collectives are ulti-
mately reducible to individuals for
whom, as the philosopher Dale
Jamieson notes, “cooperativeness
would be…[an] important characteristic
of agents who could successfully
address the problems of climate
change.” But taken to its logical conclu-
sion, it means that agents must address
the problem in coordinated and expan-
sive ways, building from within the local
and extending into the international. 
The degree to which this will occur is
dependent on the forms of governance
or “ways in which societies organize
themselves…[to manage] conflict and
achieve their goals,” notes the political
scientist Daniel J. Fiorino in Can
Democracy Handle Climate Change?       
As Fiorino argues, some forms are more
effective than others in dealing with a
problem like climate change, with full
democracies (e.g., Norway and Sweden)
being better than both flawed democra-
cies (e.g., Serbia and Croatia) and hybrid
regimes (e.g., Bosnia and Macedonia).
(Kosovo escapes classification in the
Economist Intelligence Unit [EIU]
Democracy Index, though I am inclined
to think it is not a full democracy.) 
Core Characteristics
On the one hand, full democracies pos-
sess core characteristics like free and fair
elections, limits on governmental power,
and an independent and diverse media,
as well as score high marks for political
participation and culture. 
On the other hand, flawed democra-
cies meet only some core criteria and
are deficient in political participation
and culture, whereas hybrid regimes fall
short in many areas.
These differences are important, for it is
the “bundle” of characteristics pos-
sessed by strong democracies that pro-
vides quality governance, which pro-
motes the building of coalitions crucial
to effective climate action. 
And herein lies the major problem for a
less than full democracy: it has difficulty
building coalitions. Not only to form the
necessary political and economic
transformations in-country, but also to
build coalitions internationally. 
Specifically, if countries like Bosnia and
Kosovo are to become strong coalition
partners against climate change, they
need to work through their “post-con-
flictedness” to create a fuller democra-
cy and a sustainable peace. 
But to do that will require taking on the
ethno-nationalisms that are endemic to
the Balkans. This is no easy task given
that nationalism is a tribalism that
includes/privileges one’s own people
and excludes/disqualifies all others. 
It foments an attitude of us-against-
them that is hostile to coalitions
between those who differ, denying a
certain moral gracefulness in their deal-
ings with one another.   
The American journalist David Wallace-
Wells acknowledges the connection
between these ism’s and climate
change in his recent The Uninhabitable
Earth: Life After Warming, when he writes
that “just as the need for…[internation-
al] cooperation is paramount, indeed
necessary for anything like the world we
know to survive, we are only unbuilding
those alliances—recoiling into national-
istic corners and retreating from collec-
tive responsibility and from each other.”  
Wallace-Wells may be right about such
“unbuilding” occurring within the United
States, but parts of the Balkans have far
fewer alliances to “unbuild.” In fact,
ethno-nationalist identities are so domi-
nant among individuals in Bosnia and
Kosovo that they reverberate within
entire ethnic groups leading to
“in–group” hypersolidarity and “out-
group” distrust, and the formation of
ethnic enclaves. 
But there are differences: we find a fail-
ing “democratic” multiethnic society
(diverse and weakly interactive/integra-
tive) in Bosnia and a stagnating “demo-
cratic” plural monoethnic society
(diverse non-interactive/non-integrative)
in Kosovo. No matter, ethnic enclaves
are the physical impediments, the bul-
warks against strong multiethnic soci-
eties that promote democracy and
peace building, as well as a robust col-
laboration towards dealing with global
problems like climate change.  
But if these lived-in ethnic enclaves have
a physical geography to them, their
materiality will be created and main-
tained in part by evocative objects. 
These objects can mean many things to
many people. Here I take them to be
physical objects, which by evoking
memories and precipitating ideas, res-
onate cognitively, affectively, and
conatively along ethno-nationalist lines
for a person. Building on Sherry Turkle’s
insightful Evocative Object: Things We
Think With, evocative objects stress “the
inseparability of thought and feeling
[and striving] in our relationship to
things…[and] bring[s] together intellect
and emotion [and volition].” 
They “color” a person’s world, making it
meaningful for them in a much lived
sense.  
Positive and Negative
In Kosovo, however, the same object will
resonate very differently depending on
who is viewing (or thinking, recalling,
imagining) it—they are, in effect,
“observer-sensitive.” The flag of Albania
and photos of Adem Jashari, for
instance, are likely to resonate positive-
ly with Kosovo Albanians, but negatively
for Kosovo Serbs. 
The reverse effects are likely to be had
with the state flag of Serbia and photos
of Slobodan Milošević. 
Also, evocative objects have both cen-
tripetal and centrifugal effects on peo-
ple. Objects that resonate positively
with a person will pull them in and make
that person feel welcome, whereas
those that resonate negatively will push
them away and make that person feel
unwelcomed. 
Given that evocative objects have
these effects, serving as boundary
markers that welcome some and unwel-
come others, and that ethno-nationalist
identities tend to be dominant for many,
it is no wonder that ethnic enclaves exist
in Kosovo. 
And they do so not only as physical
geographies, but also as geographies
of ideas, emotions, and strivings—
“lived-in” social and psychic geogra-
phies—of “niche cultures.”  
Because enclaves impede the forma-
tion of a multiethnic society that sup-
Northern Mitrovica
ports the building of democracy, or,
more importantly, of deliberative
democracy, which emphasizes deliber-
ative engagement by neighbors and
parliamentarians alike, the obvious
approach is to attack enclaves at their
core—the objects that support them.  
Legislating away these objects is next to
impossible, and while change through mass
education and attrition of recalcitrants may
occur, it will be far too slow to rely on. 
It can be supplemented, however, by
using civic design (whose goal is to create
persons who work toward civic improve-
ment) to change neighborhood demo-
graphics and dynamics by physically
removing objects that are ethno-national-
ly antagonistic and by replacing them
with “shared objects of positive evocativi-
ty” (e.g., the neighborhood market as a
place for all to congregate) or “shared
objects of negative evocativity” (e.g., the
bridges and roads washed out by climate
change-induced flooding). 
Outward Expression
Admittedly, there is some erasing of the
outward expression of culture and thus,
some homogenization, but it is more
than offset by establishing spaces of
interaction and integration, spaces that
promote both agreement and dis-
agreement (commonality and differ-
ence), and the preservation of plurality. 
Enclave insularity and polarization are
deterred by proximal or face-to-face
conversations that endure over time,
perhaps a long time. One can only
hope that the environment will be a
topic of those conversations.    
It is through the death of the enclave
that a multiethnic society begins to take
shape, offering space for the sort of
democratic society that is conducive
for making coalitions within and
between the full range of collectives—
neighborhoods, cities, municipalities,
entities, the state, the region, the
International Community. 
By transitioning from a flawed democra-
cy or a hybrid regime to a full-fledged
democracy, it is hoped that Bosnia,
Kosovo, and the other Balkan countries
will indulge in more effective climate
action. 
The physicalist approach to enclave
demise proposed here is just one step in
that process. Wanting to save the plan-
et and, thus, ourselves, is a no-brainer,
but sometimes our lives (and enclaves)
just get in the way. We are, so to speak,
not up to the task.  
By physically changing the places in
which we live and work, it is hoped that
ethnic enclaves can be a thing of the
past and thoughtful experimentation
and productive coalition building on
urgent matters like climate change can
become a thing of the future.  
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President Aleksandar Vucic insisted that there is no evidence
to detain a former senior policeman for the killings of the
three Albanian-American Bytyqi brothers in Serbia in 1999
‘No Evidence’ for Arrest 
for US Albanians’ Deaths
Aleksandar Vucic told the Serbianparliament on Monday eveningthat “there is no evidence of who
committed the murder” of Ylli, Agron,
and Mehmet Bytyqi – US citizens of
Albanian origin who were killed in
Serbia in 1999.
Vucic said that without evidence, no
one be arrested based “only on media
reports and lawyers’ claims”, because
“Serbia is a serious state”.
The Bytyqi brothers’ family have repeat-
edly accused Vucic of failing to fulfil his
promises to make progress towards
clearing up the case.
They believe that Goran Radosavljevic,
alias Guri, who was the commander of
a police training centre where the
brothers’ bodies were eventually found,
is the main suspect in the case.
Radosavljevic, who is now a senior offi-
cial of Vucic’s ruling Progressive Party,
was briefly investigated over the crime
by the Serbian prosecution, but never
indicted. He denies any involvement.
Vucic said on Monday that
Radosavljevic could not be arrested
without evidence.
“People have been killed, the crime has
been committed, but when looking for
evidence from someone, they say ‘why
you do not arrest Guri?’, and then we
say ‘give us the evidence’, and then
there is no evidence,” he said.
On Monday, the Bytyqi family appealed
to Vucic to put pressure on Vlastimir
Djordjevic, a former high-ranking
Serbian interior ministry official who was
jailed by the Hague Tribunal for war
crimes in Kosovo, to reveal more infor-
mation about the case and about other
hidden graves from the Kosovo war.
They suspect that Djordjevic, who could
be due for early release soon, was also
implicated in the brothers’ deaths.
The three Bytyqi brothers went to fight for
the Kosovo Liberation Army against
Belgrade’s forces and were arrested by
Serbian police after the war ended
when they strayed over an unmarked
boundary line between Serbia and
Kosovo.
After serving their sentences for illegal
border crossing, they were re-arrested
as they were leaving the district prison in
the town of Prokuplje in southern Serbia,
taken to the police training centre in
Petrovo Selo, and detained in a ware-
house there.
They were then tied up with wire by
unknown persons and driven to a
garbage disposal pit, where they were
executed with shots to the back of the
neck on July 9, 1999.
During the trial of two Serbian police
officers who were ultimately acquitted
of transporting the brothers to the police
training centre, witnesses claimed that
Djordjevic gave them the order to drive
the Albanian-Americans to Petrovo Selo.
Radosavljevic has insisted he was on
vacation when the brothers were killed.
In December 2018, the US government
banned him from entering the country
because of his alleged involvement in
human rights violations in the Kosovo war.
He said at the time that he did not want
to comment on the US State Department
decision.
“I gave statements to the investigative
authorities, I spoke about that a hun-
dred times, so it doesn’t make sense
that I speak about that,” Radosavljevic
told Radio Free Europe.
